The Far Right in the European Union : a resistible electoral rise – but a political one?

The legislative elections held in Spain on November 29, 2026, will mark the early start of a crucial electoral cycle for the European Union (EU) and its member states, as it will include eight national elections by the end of 2027, spanning the entire continent. What exactly can we anticipate at the outset of such a sequence, which many observers describe as conducive to the rise of far-right parties, in a political and media climate quick to highlight their slightest gains – even in regional elections (such as in Saxony-Anhalt)?

To address this issue, it should be noted that we will focus here on the political groups formed in the European Parliament and the parties that are members of them ¹, noting that two far-right factions then stand out clearly: on the one hand, the group formed by “Patriots for Europe” (PfE), chaired by Jordan Bardella and comprising the “National Rally” (RN) and its allies; and, on the other hand, the group centered around the German party “Alternativ für Deutschland” (AfD) within the “Europe of Sovereign Nations” (ESN) group². The stance of the parties united within the “European Conservatives and Reformists” (ECR) group is more ambiguous: originally founded by the British conservatives, this group in fact brings together a number of governing parties under the joint leadership of members of Georgia Meloni’s party, “Fratelli d’Italia,” and the Polish “Law and Justice” (PiS) party – two parties that, like their counterparts, oscillate between the “radical right” and the extreme right, and are, moreover, challenged on their right by parties belonging to the two aforementioned families³.

It is on the basis of this framework that we will now conduct a brief analysis of the political dynamics favoring far-right parties in the EU, as well as the election results they achieved in 2026, or those attributed to them by voting intentions’polls looking ahead to the end of 2027. As we shall see, these analytical findings largely refute the observation or prediction of an unstoppable rise of the far right in the EU, and raise questions about the causes and effects of the widespread media attention that such a claim nevertheless generates.

1. Tectonic shifts favoring the far right, but in search of seismic fault lines

The rise of far-right parties in the EU over the past 20 years stems from a combination of several structural dynamics, which are worth briefly reviewing – while noting that they have not led to a political and institutional landslide since then.

1.1 Dynamics favorable to far-right parties

Before analyzing the actual or projected electoral performance of far-right parties, it is undoubtedly useful to recall which dynamics – sometimes converging – may have contributed to their rise in recent years across EU countries—and even beyond—beyond the specific characteristics of each national democratic arena.

First, identity-based dynamics. Europe’s demographic decline and the necessary – and sometimes chaotic – reliance on immigration fuel a form of cultural anxiety that far-right parties echo, as does the expression of an increasingly assertive racism, from which they struggle to distance themselves. The same is true of Islam, which also stirs up identity-based tensions against the backdrop of Europe’s de-Christianization, as well as security anxieties in the wake of successive terrorist attacks. These tensions go hand in hand with “nativist” aspirations that fuel, in a jumble, criticism of the right to abortion, assisted reproductive technology (ART), and assisted dying; opposition to the rights conferred to homosexuals (particularly regarding marriage and parenthood); as well as a broader condemnation of the LGBTQ+ movement and so-called “woke” activism ,” which far-right parties have adopted as their own.

Next, geopolitical dynamics. Far-right parties have also served as a receptacle for the tensions generated by the new international landscape: on the economic and social front, as “globalization” has led to gains in purchasing power but also resulted in significant job losses, particularly in the industrial sector; on the diplomatic and security fronts, after Moscow, and then Washington, launched aggressive and military actions that fuel inflation, as well as the temptation to retreat behind good old national borders… While these geopolitical dynamics also contribute to the deepening of European integration, the latter provokes reactions of rejection that target both the de facto solidarity at work within the EU (financial, budgetary, migratory, etc.), the standards it produces – perceived as too numerous and too intrusive – and its complex and sometimes opaque functioning. Far-right parties are quick to capitalize on such rejection, even though the largely negative consequences of “Brexit” have caused them to tone down their instinctive Europhobia, albeit for tactical reasons.

Anti-environmental dynamics as well. The electoral performance of far-right parties may have been amplified by their criticism of the consequences and content of the ecological transition underway on our continent – when they are not outright denying the reality of climate change or, at the very least, its human-caused origins. Heating with fuel oil or wood, using internal-combustion vehicles, and making unrestrained use of pesticides or plastic… can thus all be presented as practices being part of a “traditional way of life” that must also be preserved against the diktats of “technocrats” portrayed as out of touch with social – if not environmental – realities.

Political dynamics, finally. Far-right parties can thrive all the more on the rejection of the ruling elites – who are presumed to be out of touch with the people and incapable of solving their problems – precisely because most of them have never held power and can therefore present themselves as an innovative alternative. This position as a fallback option can be all the stronger in countries governed by grand coalitions or “central blocs”, which favor democratic alternation in favor of more peripheral parties, against a backdrop of public debate marked by fragmentation and polarization. The exclusion of far-right parties from power is also partly linked to the historical legacy (Nazism, Fascism, Pétainism, Francoism, etc.) with which they were burdened, and which the passage of time has made less influential in the choices of voters, particularly those from younger generations.

1.2 The overall limited institutional weight of far-right parties

All of the dynamics outlined above can contribute to strengthening the electoral appeal of far-right parties – just as they can do for the major governing parties – especially on the right – which may choose to echo their messages, not to forget the appeal of opportunistic and catch-all parties that have evolved or emerged in response to civic disaffection for traditional political elites.

Far-right parties also have the distinctive feature of benefiting from increasingly explicit ideological and material support from foreign powers (particularly Putin’s Russia and Trump’s United States), whose leaders target the EU and traditional governments while viewing these parties as allies. This support may be accompanied by highly operational assistance within a new information ecosystem structured by opinion channels and social media, which apparently can be easily steered in favor of far-right candidates and parties—as Elon Musk does not hesitate to do openly via the “X” platform .” It should be noted that such support can prove to be a double-edged sword, given the mounting military, economic, and electoral setbacks faced by the alleged backers of far-right parties, but also in light of their hostility toward the very national interests that these parties are reputed to defend…

All in all, the tectonic shifts mentioned above seem so convergent and so powerful that one might wonder why they have not led to a series of resounding victories for far-right parties on our continent, and above all why they contrast with their, all things considered, limited institutional influence, since these parties are in fact in power in only a handful of EU countries (see Box 1).

Box 1

Far-right parties participating in governing coalitions in EU countries as of November 2026

It therefore appears that only the presence of “seismic fault lines” in the countries concerned – that is, specific social, economic, financial, energy-related, historical, cultural, and institutional characteristics – could have led to a few electoral victories, which are often portrayed as “earthquakes,” but from which countries lacking such fault lines are more easily spared.

We will examine below the validity of such a claim and, more prosaically, the robustness of predictions foretelling the irresistible rise of far-right parties, by taking stock of the national elections held in the EU since the beginning of 2026 and analyzing the electoral prospects for those to be held in the coming year.

2. The national elections held in the EU in 2026 did not result in success for far-right parties

In this regard, we must first emphasize that far-right parties did not come in first in any of the eight parliamentary elections held in EU countries since the beginning of 2026 (see Table 1). While Victor Orban’s clear and symbolic defeat in April 2026 was widely discussed far beyond Hungary’s borders, the same cannot be said for the election results in the seven other countries—results that nevertheless deserve to be recalled, distinguishing between those in which the far right has been reduced to a mere fraction and those where it is present but far from power.

Table 1

Election results obtained by far-right partiesin national elections across the EU (January–November 2026)

Source: “Europe Elects” data, calculations by Yves Bertoncini * = 2 parties

2.1 A Far Right Reduced to a Minimal Presence (Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovenia, Malta)

Far-right parties initially posted low results in four EU countries :

– In Slovenia, the March 2026 parliamentary elections saw the liberal Prime Minister (28,6% of the vote) replaced by Janez Jansa, a conservative Prime Minister affiliated with the EPP (27,8%), who now leads a coalition government uniting the right and the center-right, while the party “Resni.ca” affiliated with the ESN, received only 2.8% of the vote and no seats in Parliament.

– In Denmark, the March 2026 general election resulted in the victory and re-election of a left- and center-led coalition headed by Social Democratic Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen (21,9% of the vote), who finished ahead of the Greens (11,5%) and the Liberals (10,1%), while the “Danish People’s Party” (DF), affiliated with the PfE group, came in 5^th place with less than 10% of the vote.

– In Bulgaria, the April 2026 parliamentary elections resulted in the defeat of the conservative party (13,3% of the vote) and the victory of a six-party coalition called “Progressive Bulgaria” (44,5%) led by former President Rumen Radev, a former communist who now presents himself as “independent”; the far-right party “Revival” affiliated with the ESN, won only 4.2% of the vote and 12 seats, down from 33 previously.

– Finally, in Malta, the May 2026 general election saw the “Labor Party” re-elected for a 4^th consecutive term (51,7% of the vote) and the defeat of the “Nationalist Party” (44,6%) affiliated with the EPP – within a two-party political system that leaves little room for other parties, including those on the far right.

2.2 The far right is present, but far from power (Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Sweden)

Far-right parties achieved more substantial results in 2026 in four other EU countries, though they were not in a position to support the ruling governing coalitions there:

– The parliamentary elections held in Hungary in April 2026 initially resulted in a clear defeat for Viktor Orbán, whose party “FIDESZ-KDNP” still secured 38% of the vote, compared to 53% for the “TISZA” coalition—supported by right-wing, centrist, and left-wing parties and led by conservative leader Peter Magyar, an EPP member who has since then become Prime Minister. Another far-right party “Mi Hazánk,” affiliated with the ESN, garnered 5% of the vote, as it had in the previous elections in 2022.

– The parliamentary elections held in Cyprus in May 2026 resulted in a victory for the center-right “Democratic Rally” (“DISY”), affiliated with the EPP, with 27.1% of the vote, ahead of the Progressive Party of Working People (“AKEL”) at 23,9% and the “Centrist Party” (DIKO) at 10%; these elections were marked by the relative success of the “National Popular Front” (ELAM), affiliated with the ECR, which became the country’s third-largest party with 10.8% of the vote and 8 seats (out of 56), at the expense of the left.

– In Sweden, the September 2026 parliamentary elections saw the “Social Democratic Party” win 28% of the vote, ahead of the ruling right-wing “Moderates,” which received 19% of the vote, and the “Sweden Democrats” (affiliated with the ECR), which saw its support drop to 17% and 62 seats (down from 73 previously), and which had until then supported the government without participating in it; this new electoral landscape could lead to the formation of a left- and center-of-the-spectrum coalition and should, in any case, limit the institutional influence of the far right.

– In Latvia, it is ultimately the “United List” – a regionalist, conservative, and pro-European political alliance formed by the “Latvian Green Party,” the “Latvian Association of Regions,” the “Liepaja” party” and the “United List of Latvia” association – that came out on top in the October 2026 parliamentary elections, with 35% of the vote. It finished well ahead of the two far-right parties, “Latvia First” (13.25%) and “Sovereign Power-New Latvians” (11.9%), both of which are affiliated with or close to the PfE.

Overall, it is clear that not only have far-right parties performed poorly in the eight national elections held in EU countries since the beginning of 2026, but also that their dismal results have prevented them from participating in any of the coalitions that have formed since then in the countries concerned.

3. Far-right parties could achieve a few rare national victories in the EU by the end of 2027

While all national election results recorded in the EU since the beginning of 2026 contradict the narrative predicting an unstoppable rise of the far right, we must rely on polls—which are, by nature, more unreliable and volatile— to attempt to anticipate what might happen in the eight upcoming national elections.

By examining the trends in the summaries of voting intention surveys published for each of these eight countries⁴ – and with the utmost caution – we will try and present the current balance of partisan power, once again measuring the gap between the most widely reported predictions and the projections available at this stage (see Table 2).

Table 2

Voting intentions attributed to far-right parties in national elections across the EU between November 2026 and December 2027

Source: “Europe Elects” data as of early November 2026, calculations by Yves Bertoncini

2.1 A relatively weak far right (Estonia and Greece)

Far-right parties appear, at first glance, set to achieve modest results in two of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2027.

– On the one hand, in Greece, where parliamentary elections are scheduled for July 2027 at the latest, and where the ruling Conservatives (EPP) are projected to receive about 30% of the vote, compared to 16% for the radical left (ELAS), 13% for the Socialists (PASOK), and 7% for “Greek Solution” (ECR) – with SYRIZA projected to receive less than 5%, as are the other parties.

– Second, in Estonia (March 7, 2027), where polls currently place the opposition in the lead, with the Center Party (KESK), which has long been affiliated with the Liberals and is now close to the ECR (23%) and the “Isaama” party, affiliated with the EPP (22%), followed by the Social Democrats (17%), the far-right EKRE party (PfE) at 15%, and the liberal “Reform” party (12%), …

2.2 An outgoing far right—and thus on the way out (Finland, Slovakia, and Italy)?

The parliamentary elections scheduled in Finland (April 18, 2027) , in Slovakia (no later than September 28, 2027), and in Italy (no later than December 22, 2027) pose a second major challenge for far-right parties: they are, in fact, part of the ruling coalition in these three countries, and thus risk facing a “punitive vote” targeting incumbents after having initially benefited from it. This was, for example, the fate recently suffered by Viktor Orbán’s party in Hungary and Geert Wilders’ party in the Netherlands – this “punitive vote” can probably also be cited in connection with the Czech Senate elections in October 2026, in which the Prime Minister’s party (« ANO ») failed to win a single seat, as did its coalition partners.

– In this context, the upcoming election in Finland appears to be the least favorable for the far right, since the “True Finns” party – now affiliated with the ECR and holding the position of Deputy Prime Minister – is projected to receive only 16% of the vote, as are its Conservative coalition partners (affiliated with the EPP), compared to 23% for the Social Democrats (SDP). In this context, the projected results for the Liberals (13% for Kesk), the radical left (12%), and the Greens (8%) point to the likelihood of a shift to the left in the country, or, if necessary, the formation of a broad centrist coalition – and thus, in either case, a defeat for the far right.

– The electoral outlook for Slovakia appears more uncertain, against a backdrop of electoral realignment and fragmentation. The “Liberals,” however, are projected to receive 18%, slightly ahead of the outgoing Prime Minister’s “SMER”- formerly social democratic and now unaffiliated at the European level (at 18%) – and 12% for “Republika”, an ally of the AfD. The “Conservative Party,” affiliated with the EPP, is projected to receive only 10% at this stage, and the party affiliated with the ECR group, 8% – therefore, there is no gain for the far right in this country either, even if its continued hold on power within a more or less coherent coalition cannot be ruled out.

– The electoral future of Italy also seems uncertain, even after Georgia Meloni’s government passed an electoral law granting a majority bonus to any coalition reaching 42% of the vote. While “Fratelli d’Italia” the Prime Minister’s party, is currently polling at 28% of the vote, its two current coalition partners fare less well, with 7% of voting intentions (for “Forza Italia”) and 6% (for “Lega”). Matteo Salvini’s party faces competition on its right from “Futuro Nazionale” led by former General Roberto Vannaci (credited with 7%), whose participation in a new grand coalition between the right and the far right is not a foregone conclusion. However, the “Democratic Party ” (at 20%), the “Five Star Movement” (at 13%), the “Alliance of the Greens and the Left-AVS” (at 6%), and the Liberals of “Azione” (3%) should secure 42% of the vote and then agree on a governing platform in order to be able to propose an alternative majority…

2.3 A possible shift to the far right (Spain, France, or even Poland)?

The elections scheduled for November 29, 2026, in Spain, followed by those in France (on April 18 and May 2, 2027) and in Poland (no later than November 11, 2027), represent major opportunities for far-right parties—as well as a significant risk for the EU, since they are taking place in three of its most populous and influential countries.

– The early parliamentary elections scheduled in Spain appear to favor a change in government if the right-wing party forms an alliance with the extreme-right party, after more than 8 years of the Sánchez government. With just a few weeks to go before the election, the conservatives of the “Partido Popular” are projected to receive 33% of the vote, while their potential extreme-right partner, the “Vox” party (an ally of the RN), is projected to receive 21%. The PSOE could win 28% of the vote, but its potential left-wing partners are projected to receive 7% (“Frente Amplio”), 7% (“Sumar”), and 3% (“Podemos”), while the results for regionalist parties are more uncertain, as is their support for potential coalitions.

– The upcoming elections in Poland could result in a degree of continuity with the current situation : the ruling “Civic Coalition” which brings together right-wing, centrist, and left-wing parties – and whose leader and Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, is affiliated with the EPP – is projected to receive 33% of the vote, while the “Law and Justice” party (PiS), which was defeated in the previous parliamentary elections (and one of whose members is the President of the Republic), has slipped to 22%. This decline stems from the defection of Mateusz Morawiecki, the former PiS Prime Minister from 2017 to 2023, who recently founded the political association “Development Plus” (polled at 6%), claiming to distance himself from his former party’s radical shift; it is also due to increased competition from two extreme-right parties: the “Confederation of Freedom and Independence”, an ally of the AfD, polling at 13%, and the “Confederation of the Polish Crown” (unaffiliated), projected at 9% – while the Social Democrats are capped at 8% and the radical left at 4%. In this context, the return to power of a coalition formed by all Polish radical-right and extreme-right parties seems unlikely.

– Based on the polls and the current political climate, it is therefore undoubtedly in France that the extreme right’s rise to power in 2027 seems most likely, with the RN projected at 32% – moreover in a final showdown with a candidate from the radical left (at 16%) whose chances of success appear very slim – and with the other current candidates polling below 10% at this stage. And it is also in France that a victory by the extreme right could have the most substantial consequences, both domestically and at the European level: on the one hand, because the French political system allows for the direct election of a President of the Republic who holds institutional powers unmatched in European and Western democracies; and second, because it makes the formation of a coalition with more “mainstream” or moderate parties – as is the practice in all other EU countries – a priori unnecessary. Marine Le Pen’s election to the Élysée would therefore have the immediate effect of granting her a major role in all matters falling within the presumed “reserved domain” of the Presidency of the Republic (foreign policy, defense, European policy,…), with a substantial shift in policy that would generate significant tensions with our neighbors and the EU. To be fully effective, this would require that a dissolution of the National Assembly result in a majority supporting her political agenda – which is by no means guaranteed; otherwise, it would expose France to the risks of an unprecedented and conflict-ridden “cohabitation,” which would greatly affect the country’s governability, its European and international influence and the functioning of the EU.

4. The far right in the EU: a disproportionate political and media influence relative to its electoral and institutional weight

The dual retrospective and prospective analysis outlined above provides a relatively well-substantiated refutation of the thesis of an irresistible rise of far-right parties within the EU :

– No far-right party has come in first in any of the eight national elections held in the EU since January 2026 and none are part of the resulting governing coalitions ;

– Aside from the two countries where far-right parties are part of the outgoing governing coalitions (Italy and Slovakia), only the elections held in Spain and France appear likely to enable extreme-right parties to come to power – as a junior partner for “Vox” in Spain, and in a monopolistic and dominant position for the “RN ” in France.

In this context, the most ardent proponents of the theory of an unstoppable rise of the far right can certainly still point out that parties belonging to this movement are currently leading the polls in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Germany – except that parliamentary elections in these countries are not scheduled anytime soon, and these parties’ ability to assume governmental responsibilities in a coalition remains to be seen (particularly for the “AfD ” in Germany).

In light of the raw facts, more cautious observers and analysts must, for their part, examine the causes and effects of the public’s recurring overestimation of the far right’s electoral clout in the EU –  so as to restore the conditions for a political debate that is more balanced and better aligned with citizens’ expectations.

4.1 The overestimation of the far right’s electoral clout: more or less legitimate causes

The overestimation of the far right’s electoral clout by most observers of European politics may stem primarily from political – or even moral – considerations. This is because the rise of far-right parties is not a given, neither in light of their detestable historical roots nor in light of their radical programmatic vision – that it captures greater public attention than the umpteenth victory of a conservative, liberal, or social-democratic party – especially since their ascents to power remain rather rare events. This public focus is certainly less intense than that which accompanied the rise to power of Jörg Haider’s “FPÖ” in Austria in 1999, but it remains quite strong – to the point of creating a distorted view of partisan and electoral power dynamics in EU countries.

The other major reason for this excessive focus lies in the complexity of political and partisan lives in the 27 EU countries, which remain difficult to track and analyze in depth and with accuracy, unless one has substantial human and/or financial resources dedicated to this purpose. The economic, financial, security, and even human interdependence among EU countries has increased public interest in elections held in neighboring countries, which is generally a healthy development. But such interdependence has not been accompanied by a parallel movement of civic education, with the result that our neighbors’ campaigns and democratic outcomes are often perceived – wrongly – as a political reality that can be easily transposed, if not imported… As public debate is increasingly dominated by immediacy and emotion, a form of intellectual laziness then prevails when it comes to analyzing electoral dynamics across such a wide variety of European countries: it leads to reducing political confrontation to a struggle between the extreme right and the republican camp, or even to a conflict between the “good guys” and the “bad guys”—at the risk of giving disproportionate prominence to those designated as “bad guys.”

The French add to these biases a structural tendency to project onto their neighbors political frameworks modeled on the French situation, which ignore France’s unique characteristics while hindering their ability to understand those of their EU neighbors – as if we were voting by proxy, but at the wrong polling stations… This distortion of national judgment is particularly striking when it comes to discussing the electoral and political influence of the extreme right, which is indeed substantial in France but much more limited elsewhere.

4.2 The overestimation of the far right’s electoral weight: adverse political effects

The overestimation of the far right’s electoral weight produces adverse political effects, foremost among which is the attention given to their favorite issues, particularly those related to identity and security. This is not to deny that these issues must be addressed seriously and thoroughly in national and European public debates, but simply to avoid making them the dominant themes in the context of citizens’ and voters’ concerns and expectations—which can be gauged based on the numerous available opinion polls⁵. The latest biannual survey published by the European Commission thus indicates that, in the eyes of the European respondents, the economic and social situation and international conflicts are the most important issues to be addressed, both at the EU and national levels (see Box 2), and that immigration – an obsessive theme of the extreme right – is far from being at the top of the list of the 10 main challenges identified.

Box 2

The most pressing political challenges according to the Europeans (2 possible answers)

Source: Eurobarometer Standard 105 data, European Commission, May 2026

Logically, therefore, democratic debate and media attention should focus first and foremost on these issues, which citizens consider priorities, rather than on topics championed by generally marginal parties. Indeed, it is by no means a trivial matter to devote more debate time to housing and purchasing power rather than to immigration and identity; to international security and the Russian threat rather than to everyday safety and crime; gender-based and sexual violence rather than development aid; climate and environmental degradation rather than regulatory and fiscal constraints; education and social cohesion rather than national greatness—or even the role of the EU; and so on.

On this last point, it is noteworthy, for example, that far-right parties must contend with the EU public’s attachment to the idea that “unity is strength”: they cannot easily distance themselves from an underlying Europhobia that has been transformed into a superficial Euroskepticism, the impact of which could be destabilizing – the central question being whether European issues are placed at the heart of election campaigns and whether thereby play a decisive role in voters’ motivations.

In any case, it is by promoting a public debate whose topics are more in tune with the expectations and priorities of citizens in EU countries – and whose participants are selected in proportion to their actual institutional and political clout – that we will restore the conditions for duly informed and enlightened democratic choices, both in France and among its neighbors.

The electoral rise of the far right in EU countries is neither automatic nor inevitable, contrary to what many observers and actors would have us believe. The parties that identify with this movement already enjoy media coverage and political influence far greater than their electoral and institutional weight – to the point that they sometimes end up shaping the agenda and decisions of governments without even needing to be part of them…

It would therefore be beneficial if all participants in the public debate regain a sense of reality and proportion over the coming months, in order to create the conditions for a healthier democratic debate: this is the shared responsibility of the media – including private ones -, social media regulators and operators (particularly those from the USA), political parties, particularly those on the right, as well as civil society, including “think tanks”… While it is understandable that the prospect of an RN victory is causing anxiety among many French people – who have six months to avert it – this should not lead them to suggest that other EU countries are in a situation as unenviable as their own…

As for the EU, it will continue to respect the choices expressed in the national elections of its 27 member states and to welcome the representatives designated to defend their interests, even when they belong to extreme-right parties. While their growing influence in the European Parliament has recently placed them in a position to decisively support positions put forward by the conservatives of the EPP and the ECR, particularly on migration and environmental issues⁶, it is in the Council that their potential rise could have the most significant consequences: since extreme-right parties are generally hostile to European integration and focused solely on defending national interests, they are indeed capable of blocking many decisions requiring unanimity among Member States—as Viktor Orbán has often done. A potential increase in their institutional influence would likely not enable them to bring about “another Europe” but rather to undermine the functioning and effectiveness of “Europe” as it currently exists—under the benevolent gaze of their mentors and external supporters, for whom the best interests of Europeans—and of the French—are the very last of their priorities… In this context, it goes without saying that a potential victory for the extreme right in France – that is, in the country that initiated and largely inspired European integration – would have an all-the-more explosive potential, extending far beyond the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine, and the Quiévrain…